







“Environmental Policy with Green Consumerism” 
 
 
Stefan Ambec and Philippe De Donder 
 
 
July 2021  
 
Environmental Policy with Green Consumerism
Stefan Ambec∗ and Philippe De Donder†‡
July 2021
Abstract
We analyze environmental policy in a model where some consumers (dubbed green)
derive warm glow from buying a good of a higher environmental quality, and where
green firms differentiate products on their environmental quality to enjoy market power.
For any given pollution level, emission taxes turn out to be less cost-effective than an
emission standard because taxation always induces a higher wedge between the envi-
ronmental qualities of products. By stark contrast, consumers prefer taxes to standards
when the willingness to pay for greener goods is not too large. Also, the ability of green
firms to exert market power makes the tax less attractive to green consumers. When the
pollution level is endogenized via majority voting, both neutral and green consumers
vote in favor of laxer standards and therefore pollution is higher compared to the case
of non-differentiated products. By contrast, the majority chosen tax induces the effi-
cient level of pollution. Green consumerism then reduces environmental protection with
standards but not with taxes.
Key Words: environmental regulation, corporate social responsibility, green consumerism,
product differentiation, tax, standard, green label, political economy.
JEL codes: D24, D62, Q41, Q42, Q48.
∗Toulouse School of Economics, INRAE, University of Toulouse Capitole, 1 Esplanade de l’Université, 31
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1.1 Green consumerism, corporate social responsibility and envi-
ronmental policies
When firms and customers are only motivated by their self-interest, they tend to ignore their
negative impact on the environment, which leads to excessive pollution and overexploitation
of open-access natural resources such as water and clean air. This in turn calls for public
intervention to fix, or at least mitigate, this market failure. This traditional view is con-
tradicted by the many private initiatives to reduce the negative impacts of human activities
on the environment. For instance, some consumers accept to pay a higher price in order to
purchase more environmentally-friendly products. This phenomenon is sometimes referred to
as ‘green consumerism’. On the supply side, firms often reduce their emissions of pollutants
and their use of natural resources beyond what is mandated by regulations. They engage in
costly eco-labelling of their products and production processes. They endorse the so-called
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy and code of conduct.
CSR is now very popular among managers and policy makers. It is part of most business
school curricula. There is wide evidence that consumers care about CSR as many of them are
willing to pay more for greener or fair trade products. The positive view of CSR and green
consumerism contrasts with Friedman’s famous criticism published in 1970 in The New York
Times (Friedman, 1970). In an article provocatively entitled ‘The Social Responsibility of
Business is to Increase its Profits’, Milton Friedman criticized CSR for being undemocratic.
He argued that, with CSR, the businessman ‘decides whom to tax by how much and for what
purpose’. In a democratic society, ‘the machinery must be set up to make the assessment of
taxes and to determine through a political process the objectives to be served’.
Our objective is to go beyond Friedman’s criticism and to better understand the interplay
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Figure 1: Green consumerism and environmental policy stringency
between “public” and “private” politics in the context of CSR.1 Before turning to our model,
we provide some illustrative evidence of the complex relationship between green consumerism
and environmental policies. The World Value Survey (WVS) asks respondents how willing
they would be to pay much higher prices in order to protect the environment. The share
of those answering that they were very or fairly willing is significant, ranging from 20 to 60
percent depending on the country, as reported on the horizontal axis of Figure 1. In this figure,
we also plot the stringency of the environmental policies implemented in various countries, as
measured by the Environmental Policy Stringency (EPS) index computed by the OECD. 2
Figure 1 suggests that the relationship between the stringency of environmental policies and
green consumerism is complex, the two being neither simple substitutes nor complements.
1In the words of Benabou and Tirole (2010, p.15), “While the invisible hand of the market and the more
visible one of the state have been the objects of much research, we still know little about the decentralized
correction of externalities and inequality.”
2The computation of the EPS index is detailed in https://www.oecd.org/economy/greeneco/How-
stringent-are-environmental-policies.pdf. We use 2010 data for both indices, corresponding to the most recent
WVS, see: http://w.issp.orghome.
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To shed more light on this complex link, we develop a model incorporating social decisions
taken democratically (through majority voting over either an environmental quality standard
or an environmental tax), green consumerism (with a fraction of consumers deriving warm
glow from buying a greener product) and CSR. We take Friedman’s criticism on board by
reconciling CSR with profit-maximization (with profit-maximizing firms producing the high
quality good) in a context where social decisions are taken democratically.3
We model an economy with two types of citizens, dubbed neutral and green, who all
consume one unit of a polluting good. While all consumers suffer in the same way from
aggregate pollution, green consumers derive warm glow from their individual consumption
decision. They value the higher environmental quality of the products they purchase compared
to the mainstream ones. We call the intensity of this warm glow effect the level of green
consumerism. A higher environmental quality means a less polluting production process or
use of the product. Environmental quality does not affect the intrinsic service the product
provides to consumers over its lifespan. The motive for supplying greener goods is pure profit-
maximization: green firms bear the cost of higher environmental performance to move away
from perfect competition and to exert some market power on green consumers. We allow the
degree of competition to range from perfect competition (free entry of green good producers)
to monopoly limit pricing (a monopoly green firm competing with a fringe of brown good
producers).
Although the framework we develop is specific, several markets share its most important
features. In the retail electricity market, surveys show that some consumers are willing to
pay more for green energy (about 11-12% more according to Krishnamurthy and Kriström,
2015). Ma and Burton (2016) provide experimental evidence suggesting that their motivation
3Benabou and Tirole (2010, p15) argue that “there are three possible understandings of corporate social
responsibility: the adoption of a more long-term perspective, the delegated exercise of philanthropy on behalf of
stakeholders, and insider-initiated corporate philanthropy. The latter two understandings build on individual
social responsibility.” Our approach is consistent with the second perspective, where “profit maximization
and CSR are consistent.” (Benabou and Tirole, 2010, p.11).
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is a “buy-in warm glow for carbon mitigation”. Many retailers offer 100% green electricity
contracts at a price premium through green certificates. Some of them highlight renewable
energy sources in their advertising campaigns as a way to differentiate themselves from their
competitors. When it comes to public policy, both quantity instruments (renewable portfolio
standards) and price instruments (carbon taxes, feed-in tariffs) have been implemented. In
the automobile industry, some car manufacturers such as Honda or Tesla have specialized
in hybrid or electric vehicles. Hidrue et al. (2011) provide evidence that some consumers
are willing to pay a price premium for electric vehicles (from $6000 to $16000). In the food
retailing market, green labels such as organic food abound. As argued by Ambec and Lanoie
(2008), going green is often a product differentiation strategy to escape competition and,
thus, to exploit some market power on a niche of consumers. Some producers go beyond
standards on pesticide or antibiotic use, a public policy alternative to the (non-mandatory)
organic label. Pesticides are not only regulated through standards, they are often taxed to
disincentivize their use. Both the standards and taxes on pesticides are collectively decided
at the level of a country and/or local communities.
In accordance with these examples, we contrast two forms of public intervention: a stan-
dard on environmental quality and a tax on pollution. We first consider an arbitrary pollution
target. A major difference between the two instruments is that the standard determines the
quality of the brown good but not of the green one, which depends only on the green con-
sumers’ warm-glow intensity. This in turn means that a single good is produced if the warm
glow/green consumerism intensity is small compared to the pollution target. By contrast,
taxation affects the quality of both goods, which are always differentiated at equilibrium.
Comparing the two instruments from an efficiency perspective, we find that the standard
dominates the tax because, regardless of the pollution reduction target, the wedge between
environmental qualities is always higher with the tax than with the standard, leading to a
higher gap between marginal abatement costs. Green consumerism then reverses the usual
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cost-efficiency advantage of the tax over the standard.4
We also compare the utility of both types of consumers with the two policy instruments.
This comparison sheds light on the second main difference between them, with taxation gen-
erating welfare transfers between stakeholders. Neutral consumers are net contributors to the
tax system when tax proceeds are redistributed in a lump sum way to all consumers. By
contrast, green consumers receive a positive net transfer provided that the supply of green
products is competitive enough, with firms capturing a larger proportion of tax proceeds,
through their pricing behavior, when the market is less competitive. We then obtain that
consumers prefer the tax to the standard except when the green consumers’ taste for envi-
ronmental quality is high enough. In particular, green consumers always prefer the tax when
the degree of competition among green firms is high. Both neutral and green consumers like
the larger wedge between the brown and green good quality levels induced by the tax, but for
different reasons. Neutral consumers buy a lower priced version of the good and free-ride on
the green consumers’ less polluting choice. This free-riding effect offsets the fact that neutral
consumers are net contributors to the tax system. Green consumers enjoy a higher warm-glow
utility with more differentiated products induced by the tax. Note that green producers are
able to capture a higher share of this warm-glow utility and of the tax revenue with more
market power, explaining why green consumers might prefer a standard when the degree of
competition is low enough. The bottom line is that both type of consumers prefer the less
cost-effective instrument (the tax) except when the willingness to pay for green goods is high
enough.
Next we endogenize the environmental target with each instrument. We adopt a political
economy approach where citizens first vote over the instrument’s level, with production and
consumption decisions taking place later on. We characterize the preferred level of each
4Note that, in our framework, the two instruments are equally cost-efficient in reducing pollution in the
absence of green consumers as a single quality good would then be produced.
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instrument starting with the standard. We find that product differentiation makes neutral
consumers vote for a lower emission standard because of the free-riding effect. Furthermore,
and counter-intuitively, green consumers vote for an even less stringent standard than neutral
consumers. Indeed, while both types of consumer share the same benefit of a higher standard
through less pollution, they differ on its cost. Unlike neutral consumers, green ones also lose
some warm glow as the standard increases, an effect which is only partially compensated by
a lower price,5 and induces them to prefer a lower standard than neutral consumers. We also
examine the collective choice of the emission tax. We obtain that both types of consumers
vote for the tax rate implementing the efficient aggregate level of pollution. However, the
resulting environmental qualities are heterogeneous and, therefore, as already mentioned, the
outcome is cost-inefficient.
Going back to Friedman’s criticism on CSR, we then highlight that having some consumers
“doing the right thing”by purchasing greener goods is not always welfare improving, even when
firms maximize profit and the level of environmental protection is chosen democratically. In
our setting, the conjunction of CSR with green consumerism leads to productive inefficiency
and substandard policies.
1.2 Related literature
Our paper builds on the literature on self-regulation and corporate social responsibility (see
Ambec and Lanoie, 2008, and Kitzmueller and Shimshack, 2012, for surveys). Most studies
aim at assessing the profitability of voluntary environmental protection and CSR strategies.
Some previous works have analyzed the interplay between environmental policies and firms’ or
consumers green behavior using different approaches. For instance, Fleckinger and Glachant
(2011) analyze a game between a social-welfare maximizing regulator and a profit-maximizing
5Except with monopoly limit pricing, in which case the green producer extracts all the warm-glow utility,
resulting in the same preferred standard for both types of consumers.
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firm with frictions in the regulation process. They show that self-regulation can be a firm’s
strategy to preempt more stringent future regulations. In the same vein, the Private Poli-
tics approach (Baron 2001, Heyes and Kapur, 2012, Daubanes and Rochet, 2019) assumes
that CSR and environmental policies result from combined pressure from lobbies (firms) and
NGOs (consumers/citizens). We depart from those studies by modeling explicitly the col-
lective decision process that determines environmental policy. Other papers highlight that
CSR might crowd-out donation and charity (Kotchen, 2006, Besley and Ghatak, 2007), or
analyze price competition and product differentiation with green consumers (Eriksson, 2004,
Conrad, 2005). However, they do not endogenize environmental regulations using a political
economy approach. The paper closest to ours is Calveras et al. (2007) which also models
green consumers with warm-glow preferences who vote on environmental regulations. They
show that the presence of green consumers might lead to laxer regulations when a majority of
voters free-ride on their contribution to the environment. We provide an even more negative
view of green consumerism when such behavior is used by firms to obtain market power: all
consumers (neutral and green) vote for a laxer minimal quality standard. Moreover, we com-
pare policies instruments and we also analyze the political outcome when an environmental
tax is implemented instead of an environmental standard.
Our paper also contributes to the literature comparing second-best policies, such as a
tax and a standard in the case of environmental externalities. The trade-off between the
two instruments do not arise because of asymmetric information on abatement cost (as in
Weitzman, 1974, Ambec and Coria, 2021), or due to the heterogeneity of the pollution sources
and damages (as in Fowlie and Muller 2019; Jacobsen 2013; Carson and LaRiviere 2018).
Compared to this literature, we obtain that standards dominate taxes even without behavioral
anomalies such as limited attention (Allcott et al. 2012) or temptation (Tsvetanov and
Segerson 2014).6
6In the same vein, Bovenberg et al. (2008) study second-best policies designed to reduce deadweight loss
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Along the same line, Jacobsen et al. (2017) demonstrates the possible superiority of
standards in a model of public good provision where agents differ in how much they value
the total amount of public good, and where the cost of public good provision is convex.7
Agents who value more the good provide more of it, creating an inefficient wedge in the
marginal cost of production. Our analysis goes further, as it endogenizes the amount of the
environmental good offered by explicitly modeling its political determination. Others studies
rely on imperfect competition models with vertical differentiation on environmental quality
to compare policy instruments (e.g. Bansal and Gangopadhyay 2003). The paper closer to
us in this field is Marini et al. (2020) who assume that brown and green firms have the
same production costs which do not vary with the environmental quality of the product. In
contrast to us, they obtain the counter-intuitive results that only the green good is provided
when green consumerism is low, and that green consumerism degrades the environment by
allowing brown firms to enter the market. Also, unlike us they do not compare and endogenize
environmental policies.
Recent papers have investigated morally motivated consumers in economic framework
with environmental externalities. Eichner and Pethig (2020) assume that some consumers
are Kantians in the sense that they choose their consumption as if all others chose the same
consumption as they do. By contrast, in our model, green consumers behave a la Nash,
taking the other’s consumption choices as given.8 Schmidt and Herweg (2021) also model a
warm-glow utility but obtain that the price instrument dominates the quantity instrument in
terms of material welfare, a result opposite to ours. This difference is due to their modeling
from externalities and obtain numerically that standards may also be preferred to taxes, because of higher
lump-sum compensation costs with the tax.
7This heterogeneity, unlike in our paper, drives the private contribution to the public good. Under our
assumption of a unitary mass of agents, each agent’s consumption decision has an infinitesimal impact on
the total level of environmental protection and is then unaffected by how much agents care for this aggregate
level. Our assumption is more in line with global pollution problems such as climate change.
8Cassin et al. (2021) study the impact of income inequality on environmental policy in the presence of
green consumers. They obtain empirically an inverted J-shape relationship between the two.
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the quantity instrument as an emission trading scheme capping total emissions, so that any
individual initiative to reduce emissions becomes ineffective since it is fully offset by the extra
emissions from the others. The standard we model does not have this unfortunate feature.
Finally, recent papers have introduced environmentalism in growth models. Bezin (2019)
studies the trade-off between growth and environmental preservation in a setting where green
preferences are formed through cultural transmission.9 Aghion et al. (2020) analyzes the
incentives to innovate in green technologies to soften competition when consumers care about
the carbon footprint of their product. They highlight a complementarity between the level of
competition and green consumerism in fostering green innovation. In our model, the degree
of competition is orthogonal to the choice of environmental quality. Market power increases
the price of the green good but not does not reduce its carbon footprint. As a result, unlike
Aghion et al. (2020), competition and green consumerism are substitute in reducing pollution
because (i) green consumers vote for laxer standards than neutral consumers, (ii) the higher
is the competition, the laxer is the standard chosen by green consumers.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section presents our setting. Section 3
investigate the implementation of a targeted pollution level with emission standard (Section
3.1) or emission tax (Section 3.2) before comparing the two outcomes (Section 3.3). Section
4 endogenizes the target reached with each policy instrument through collective choice of
standard (Section 4.1) and then tax (Section 4.2). Section 5 concludes. The more convoluted
proofs are relegated to an appendix.
9Bezin (2015) analyses an overlapping generations model of environmental externalities and capital accu-




We consider a good whose production or consumption generates environmental externalities,
typically pollution. We index pollution abatement by the continuous variable x that we call
the good’s environmental quality . A higher value of x reflects, for instance, the use of a cleaner
source of energy to produce electricity, a less polluting car, food grown with less pesticide or
water, a manufactured product that can be more easily recycled, etc. Alternatively, one can
see x as a ‘public good’ contribution to society in the corporate social responsibility (CSR)
sense, e.g. better working conditions, transparency, banning of child labor, investment in
education, infrastructure, etc. The cost of supplying one unit of the good with environmental
quality x is denoted c(x) where c(.) is an increasing, twice differentiable and convex function
of x, with c(0) = 0 and c′(0) = 0 (to guarantee interior solutions).
On the demand side, we consider a unitary mass of consumers who are divided into two
types, green and neutral, with respective shares α and 1 − α with 0 < α < 1. The types
are denoted by subscripts g and n, respectively. All consumers obtain the same private value
v from consuming one unit of the good, regardless of its environmental quality. Both types
of consumers also enjoy the same benefit b(X) from the average environmental quality X,
which is the level of environmental protection in the economy.10 The function b(.) is strictly
increasing, twice differentiable and strictly concave: b′(x) > 0 and b′′(x) < 0. Neutral con-
sumers rationally do not care directly about the pollution generated by their own purchase
decision: they do not value the environmental quality of the good they consume, since their
own consumption does not impact the average environmental quality in the economy. Their
utility when they purchase the good at price p is v− p+ b(X). By contrast, green consumers
enjoy a ‘warm glow’ from contributing to environmental protection above the lower environ-
mental quality provided by the market that we denote x0.
11 Let ω be the green consumers’
10Note that average and total environmental qualities are equal with a unitary mass of consumers.
11Assuming rather that green consumers care more about environmental protection X than neutral con-
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willingness to pay for every environmental quality above x0. The parameter ω is hereafter
referred to as the level of green consumerism while α is the share of green consumerism.
Green consumers’ utility when purchasing a good of environmental quality x at price p is
v − p+ ω(x− x0) + b(X).
On the supply side, a competitive industry is supplying the “brown”version of the good
with environmental quality x0. Perfect competition drives down profit to zero. We assume
that some firms can supply higher environmental quality than the standard, x1 > x0. We
are agnostic as to the degree of competition among firms supplying the green version of the
good. The intensity of competition is captured by a parameter θ ranging from zero for perfect
competition to one for monopoly limit pricing. For 0 < θ ≤ 1, green firms can exert some
market power from providing a greener version of the good (called the green good).12
We now investigate the impact of environmental policies for a given pollution target X.
We consider sequentially an environmental quality standard and a pollution tax. We then
compare the two instruments from a welfare perspective. The timing of the decisions runs
as follows. First, firms set simultaneously their prices and environmental quality given the
policy enacted. Second, consumers make their purchase decisions.
3 Economic outcome
In this section, we study the setting of an environmental policy imposed on all firms in order
to achieve a given aggregate level of emissions X. We examine an environmental quality
standard x0 in Section 3.1., and a pollution tax τ in Section 3.2. We compare the welfare
impact of both instruments in Section 3.3.
sumers would not induce them to consume higher quality goods than the latter, with a unitary mass of
consumers, unlike with warm glow.
12This assumption can be justified by the ownership of a specific technology or the long-term development
of a reputation for being greener. For instance, the firm is the only one that can credibly commit to issue a
label of better environmental quality.
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3.1 Environmental standard
Competition among producers of the good with minimal quality x0 drives down its equilibrium
price towards its costs, p0 = c(x0). Some firms might supply a higher environmental quality
version of the good if it is profitable to do so. Green firms supply the quality x1 > x0 at price
p1 > p0. Green consumers buy green goods whenever
13
v − p1 + ω(x1 − x0) + b(X) ≥ v − p0 + b(X).
We first assume that x1 > x0 and compute the equilibrium price depending on the degree of
competition. We then check that green firms make a positive profit, and that x1 > x0, at
that price. If it is not the case, then they offer x1 = x0 for p1 = p0.
Let us consider the extreme cases of perfect and no competition on the market for the green
good. Under perfect competition, a price-taker firm charges p1 = c(x1). Under monopoly,
the price-maker firm chooses the maximum price compatible with green consumers buying
quality x1 rather than x0– i.e., p1 = c(x0) + ω(x1 − x0). In the more general case of a degree
of competition θ ∈ [0, 1] varying between no market power (θ = 0) and full market power
(θ = 1), the price of the green good is:
p1 = θ[c(x0) + ω(x1 − x0)] + (1− θ)c(x1). (1)
A green good producer’s profit per unit sold is then
π = p1 − c(x1)
= θ[ω(x1 − x0) + c(x0)− c(x1)],
13We make the simplifying assumption that green consumers buy the green good when they are indifferent
between the brown and green ones.
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where we have used the one-to-one relationship between price and quality defined in (1).
Maximizing π with respect to x1, we obtain:
∂π
∂x1
= θ (ω − c′(x1)) ,
so that the profit-maximizing quality level, denoted by xS1 (where the superscript S denotes
the fact that firms are constrained by a standard) is such that14
c′(xS1 ) = ω, (2)
regardless of the degree of competition θ. Green firms choose environmental quality to equate
the marginal cost of providing a higher quality with the marginal benefit to the firm (through
a larger price), which is equal to the willingness to pay for environmental quality ω.15 The
corresponding price for a degree of competition θ is given by
pS1 = θ[ω(x
S
1 − x0)− [c(xS1 )− c(x0)]] + c(xS1 ). (3)
Under perfect competition, θ = 0 in (3) so that the price equals marginal cost pS1 = c(x
S
1 ).
Under monopoly (limit) pricing, θ = 1 in (3) and therefore pS1 = c(x0) + ω(x
S
1 − x0), so that
the green firm captures all the green consumer surplus created by the warm glow effect of
consuming a greener-than-x0 product. When 0 < θ < 1, green firms capture only a fraction
of this surplus.
We now show that the environmental quality xS1 is profitable for every θ > 0.
16 By
convexity of the cost function, xS1 > x0 implies c
′(xS1 )(x
S
1 − x0) > c(xS1 ) − c(x0). The last
14We concentrate on interior solutions since c′(0) = 0.
15Note from (2) that xS1 = c
′−1(ω) does not depend on x0, but increases with ω (since the cost function is
convex).
16Profits are nil for green firms when θ = 0.
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inequality combined with (2) leads to ω(xS1 −x0)− [c(xS1 )− c(x0)] > 0, which given (3) shows
that pS1 > c(x
S
1 ) when θ > 0.
When xS1 > x0 so that two environmental qualities are provided, neutral consumers buy
the good with quality x0 while green consumers buy the good with quality x
S
1 . To achieve the




1− α . (4)
Combining (2) with (4) shows that xS1 > x
S
0 when ω > c
′(X). Hence products are differenti-
ated on environmental quality if the warm-glow effect captured by the parameter ω is higher
than the marginal cost of the environmental protection target c′(X). In the polar case where
ω ≤ c′(X), no firms supply greener goods and thus the standard is the targeted environmental
quality level xS0 = X. We then obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1 With a standard, a green version of the good with environmental quality xS1 =
c′−1(ω) is supplied if ω > c′(X). Otherwise, products are homogeneous with environmental
quality X.
When the level of green consumerism ω is high enough, the demand for green goods
induces some firms to differentiate their product by supplying a greener version. This version
is charged at marginal cost under perfect competition, that is when θ = 0. In the case where
θ > 0, production differentiation on environmental quality is a strategy for green firms to
move away from perfect competition. They earn profits by extracting a share of the green
consumers’ willingness to pay for green goods. This share is increasing with θ. When θ = 1,
the monopoly captures it all as shown in (3).
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3.2 Environmental tax
We now move to another policy instrument to mitigate environmental externalities: a tax on
pollution. We denote by e the pollution emitted in the absence of any pollution abatement
effort by firms, namely when they produce a good of quality x = 0. Environmental quality x
then corresponds to the reduction in polluting emissions from that point. Pollution is taxed
at a linear rate τ . The total cost of supplying one unit of the product with environmental
performance x is c(x) + τ(e − x). The brown good producers choose the value of x that
minimizes their cost given the price of their product p0. The environmental quality they
choose is denoted by xτ0 and satisfies the following first-order condition:
τ = c′(xτ0), (5)
where the marginal cost of environmental quality equals the tax rate. The competitive price
per unit of product is defined by the zero-profit condition:
pτ0 = c(x
τ
0) + τ(e− xτ0). (6)
As in Section 3.1, the price p1 of the green version of the good depends on the degree of
competition among green firms captured by the parameter θ. Under perfect competition,
the price is equal to the marginal cost which includes the tax bill: pτ1 = c(x1) + τ(e − xτ0).
Under limit pricing, the monopoly charges the maximal price that makes green consumers
buy quality x1, which is p
τ
1 = ω(x1 − x0) + pτ0 = ω(x1 − x0) + c(xτ0) + τ(e − xτ0), where the
last equality is due to (6). More generally, with a degree of competition θ ∈ [0, 1], the price
of the green good is:
pτ1 = θ[ω(x1 − x0) + c(xτ0) + τ(e− xτ0)] + (1− θ)[c(x1) + τ(e− x1)], (7)
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with xτ0 and p
τ
0 defined by (5) and (6). The profit per unit of the green good with environmental
performance x1 is:
π = pτ1 − c(x1)− τ(e− x1) = θ[ω(x1 − xτ0) + c(xτ0)− c(x1) + τ(x1 − xτ0)], (8)
where the last equality is obtained by substituting pτ1 as defined by (7). Differentiating π with
respect to x1 yields:
∂π
∂x1
= ω − c′(x1) + τ,
so that profit is maximized at a quality level xτ1 satisfying the following first-order condition:
τ + ω = c′(xτ1). (9)
Environmental performance increases profits through two channels: higher revenue (thanks to
a larger price made possible by the green consumers’ preference for greener goods) and lower
tax paid. The best green strategy equalizes marginal cost to the sum of the green consumers’
willingness to pay and the tax rate. Green firms choose xτ1 = c
′−1(ω+τ) and charge pτ1 defined
in (7). The following proposition, proved in Appendix A, shows that green firms’ profit is









0 for all ω > 0.
Proposition 2 implies that, with a tax, products are differentiated on their environmental
quality as long as ω > 0. By contrast, with a standard, as shown in Section 3.1, products
are homogeneous with same environmental quality X when ω is low. The willingness to
17Provided of course that consumers’ willingness to pay is high enough to compensate for the tax paid:
v ≥ pτ0 and v + ω(xτ1 − xτ0) ≥ pτ1 .
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pay for environmental quality must be high enough to induce a supply of environmental
quality above the minimal quality standard. When it is the case, the environmental qualities
implemented with each instrument differ for the same average quality target X. Indeed a
fundamental difference between the environmental tax and the standard is their impact on
the environmental performance of the green product. In Section 3.1, we have shown that
the standard x0 has no direct impact on the level of environmental quality embedded in the
green good xS1 , see (2). The value of the standard only affects the decision whether or not
to supply a greener good through p1. By contrast, the tax impacts directly the green good’s
environmental performance xτ1 as shown in (9). A higher tax increases both environmental
performances xτ0 and x
τ
1 while a higher standard x0 does not change x
S
1 as long as supplying
the green good is profitable.18
With the same environmental target X, it is easy to rank the environmental qualities
provided under both instruments. By (2) and (9), we have xτ1 > x
S
1 whenever τ > 0. The
environmental quality of the green good is always higher with the tax because reducing the
tax bill provides another motive for increasing environmental quality. Now, under the same
average quality X = αxS1 +(1−α)xS0 = αxτ1 +(1−α)xτ0, xτ1 > xS1 implies xτ0 < xS0 . Hence, the
tax implements the same environmental target X with more dispersed qualities in the sense







3.3 Comparison of instruments
We now compare the performance of the two instruments for a given environmental target
X. We will consider sequentially two metrics for this comparison. First, we focus on the con-
sumers’ material welfare by ignoring the warm-glow effect. Doing so, we follow the canonical
18Note that, although both environmental qualities xτ0 and x
τ
1 depend on the tax rate, the incremental
marginal cost c′(xτ1) − c′(xτ0) does not. More precisely, the wedge between marginal costs of production
always equals the green consumers’ willingness to pay for environmental quality ω at equilibrium, namely
c′(xτ1) − c′(xτ0) = ω. This productive inefficiency of environmental taxation increases with the level of green
consumerism ω.
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approach first proposed by Hammond (1988) and Harsanyi (1995) who advocate to exclude
all external preferences, even benevolent ones, when computing a social welfare function. This
means that we “launder” the green consumers’ preferences by assuming away the warm-glow
part of their utility.19 As we show in section 3.3.1, maximizing material welfare for any given
level of aggregate pollution X corresponds to minimizing the cost of achieving this level, a
pure efficiency approach. Second, we look at what instrument consumers would prefer to use
to reach any given pollution level X. In that comparison, we of course include warm-glow as
part of the green consumers’ utility.
3.3.1 Material Welfare
Material welfare is the sum of the consumers’ surplus (without the warm-glow effect), firms’
profit, the benefit from pollution reduction, and the revenue from taxing pollution. When
products are homogeneous in their environmental quality, which only occurs with a standard
when ω ≤ c′(X), material welfare is v− p0− b(X) = v− c(X)− b(X), where the last equality
is due to perfect competition which implies p0 = c(X). Under product differentiation, green
consumers buy the good with quality xS1 > x
S
0 at price p
S
1 while the neutral ones buy the
brown good xS0 at price p
S
0 . Given the respective proportions α and 1 − α in the economy,
material welfare is:
v − αpS1 − (1− α)pS0 + b(X) + απS1 , (10)
19See Goodin (1986) for a description of the various grounds for laundering preferences. More specifically,
Benabou and Tirole (2010, p.15) write “We saw that prosocial behaviour by investors, consumers and workers
is driven by a complex set of motives: intrinsic altruism, material incentives (defined by law and taxes) and
social- or self-esteem concerns. (...) The pursuit of social- and self-esteem per se is a zero-sum game” which
may then call for laundering the preferences of these agents. For instance, “The buyer of a hybrid car feels
and looks better, but makes his neighbours (both buyers and non-buyers of hybrid cars) feel and look worse–a
‘reputation stealing’ externality” (Benabou and Tirole, 2010, p.6).
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with p0 = c(x0), X = αx
S
1 +(1−α)xS0 and πS1 = θ[ω(xS1 −x0)+c(xS0 )−c(xS1 )] with a standard,
and,
v − αpτ1 − (1− α)pτ0 + b(X) + απτ1 + τ [α(e− xτ1) + (1− α)(e− xτ0)], (11)
with X = αxτ1 + (1− α)xτ0 and πτ1 is defined in (8) with the tax.








0) + b(X), (12)
for each instrument j = S, τ . Hence the comparison of welfare is reduced to the comparison
of the cost αc(xj1) + (1− α)c(x
j
0) of achieving the target X for each instrument j = S, τ .
If ω ≤ c′(X), we know from Propositions 1 and 2 that the green good is not supplied with
the standard while it is with the tax. The welfare is thus v − c(X) + b(X) with the standard
and v− αc(xτ1) + (1− α)c(xτ0) + b(X) with the tax. The standard dominates because c(X) <
αc(xτ1)+(1−α)c(xτ0) withX = αxτ1+(1−α)xτ0 due to the convexity of the cost function. If ω >
c′(X), the green good is supplied with both instruments, although with different environmental
qualities. Given the material welfare levels defined in (12), the standard dominates the tax if
and only if αc(xS1 ) + (1−α)c(xS0 ) < αc(xτ1) + (1−α)c(xτ0). We show in Appendix B that it is
indeed the case due to the convexity of the cost function. We thus established the following
proposition.
Proposition 3 The standard implements any environmental target X at lower cost and with
higher material welfare than the tax.
Even if the two instruments implement the same level of environmental protection, the
tax does so with a higher wedge between the two environmental qualities supplied by the
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market x0 and x1 and, therefore, abatement costs are higher. In this sense, the tax is less
cost-efficient (or cost-effective) than the standard for any target X.
The degree of competition does not impact the comparison between the two instruments
when using cost-efficiency or material welfare. However, competition affects the allocation of
material welfare between consumers and firms, with green firms extracting a higher share of
green consumers’ utility when θ increases.
3.3.2 Utility
In this section, we investigate which of the two instruments is preferred by consumers to reach




1 ) the utility attained by a consumer of
type i = n, g when the standard xS0 is enacted, and a green good of quality x
S
1 is provided.
Under the standard, when ω ≤ c′(X), the goods consumed exhibit the same environmental
quality x0 = X. Therefore the utility of the two types of consumers, neutral and green, is the
same:
USn (X,X) = U
S
g (X,X) = v − c(X) + b(X). (13)
When ω > c′(X), products are differentiated with two environmental qualities xS0 and x
S
1 .
With the prices p0 = c(x
S
0 ) and p
S










1 ) = v + (1− θ)ω[xS1 − xS0 ]− θc(xS0 )− (1− θ)c(xS1 ) + b(X), (15)
where xS1 and x
S
0 are defined in (2) and (4) respectively and X = αx
S
1 + (1 − α)xS0 . With
perfect competition (θ = 0), green consumers enjoy the full extent of their warm glow and pay
a price equal to the green good’s cost. As θ increases, green firms capture a larger fraction
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of this warm glow. With monopoly (limit) pricing (θ = 1), green firms capture all the warm
glow, and green consumers have the same utility as neutral ones.
With the tax, we assume that tax proceeds are redistributed to the consumers in a lump-
sum way. Since τ(e − xτ1) and τ(e − xτ0) are collected on the green and brown products
respectively, which are in proportion α and 1−α, each consumer gets back R = ατ(e−xτ1)+
(1−α)τ(e−xτ0) = τ(e−X), where the last equality is due to the fact that X = αxτ1+(1−α)xτ0.










1) = v + (1− θ)ω[xτ1 − xτ0]− θc(xτ0)− (1− θ)c(xτ1) + b(X)
+τ [θxτ0 + (1− θ)xτ1 −X] , (17)
with xτ0 and x
τ
1 defined in (5) and (9) respectively. The last terms in the right-hand side of
both utilities are the net transfers due to the pollution tax. Since the standardized good is
more taxed than the green good, neutral consumers pay more tax than the refunded revenue,
with a net negative transfer equal to ατ [xτ1−xτ0]. The net transfer received by green consumers
decreases with the degree of market power θ. Under perfect competition θ = 0, each green
consumer obtains a net positive transfer equal to τ(1 − α)[xτ1 − xτ0]. At the polar extreme
(monopoly limit pricing), they end up with the same negative transfer as neutral consumers.
To be able to compare utilities, we introduce the following assumption of linear marginal




Assumption 1 Let c(x) = γx
2
2 .
We prove the following proposition in Appendix C (where the thresholds are explicitly
defined in (40) and (44)).
20Indeed Assumption 1 implies c′(x) = γx and, therefore xτ0 = τ/γ and x
τ
1 = (τ + ω)/γ so that an increase




Proposition 4 Assume that Assumption 1 holds and that consumers compare a tax and a
standard that both result in the same aggregate environmental protection level X.
(a) All consumers prefer the tax to the standard, except when ω is large enough and, in
the case of green consumers, when θ is large enough as well. For both consumer types,
a necessary condition to prefer the standard to the tax is that the standard generates
differentiated goods.
(b) The threshold value of ω above which a standard is preferred is increasing with X for
both types of consumers.
(c) This threshold is decreasing with θ for green consumers,
(d) This threshold is larger for green than for neutral consumers if θ < 1, and equal if θ = 1.
To prove Proposition 4 we consider successively two cases. First, when ω ≤ c′(X), products
are homogeneous with environmental quality X under the standard while they are differenti-
ated with qualities xτ0 < X < x
τ
1 with the tax. The brown version of the good being of lower
environmental quality with the tax than the standard X, it is also cheaper. This price effect
makes neutral consumers prefer the tax despite the fact that they are net tax contributors.
Green consumers enjoy an even higher utility with the tax than neutral consumers since they
always have the option to buy the brown good. On the other hand, both types of consumers
have the same utility under the standard. Hence, if the neutral consumers prefer the tax to
the standard, so do the green consumers.
Second, if ω > c′(X), products of heterogeneous environmental quality are supplied both
with the tax and with the standard. Observe first that, as ω increases, green consumers
demand a higher quality good, so that an exogenous value of X can be obtained with either
a lower value of the standard xS0 or of the tax τ . Hence, neutral consumers benefit from a
larger value of ω both under a tax and under a standard. At the same time, the net payment
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they make under a tax increases with the quality difference between the two goods, xτ1 − xτ0,
which itself increases with ω. As a consequence, they favor less the tax system as ω increases,
and we show in Appendix C that they start favoring the standard once ω reaches a threshold
(given by (40)).
As for green consumers, equation (17) shows that they receive a positive net tax transfer
(equal to (1 − α − θ)(xτ1 − xτ0)) provided that θ is low enough. We then obtain that they
always prefer the tax to the standard when the market is sufficiently competitive (i.e., θ low
enough). When θ is large, their utility increases faster with ω under the standard than under
the tax. Note that this is true even though the warm glow effect is larger with the tax than
with the standard (since the gap between both qualities provided is larger with the tax than
with the standard). We show in Appendix C that green voters favor the standard once ω
reaches a threshold (given by (44)). This threshold is larger than the corresponding one for
neutral consumers, confirming that green voters have a stronger relative preference for a tax
than neutral voters.
We then obtain that a less competitive green market (i.e., a higher value of θ) decreases
the threshold value of ω above which green voters prefer the standard to the tax. This is
due to the fact that the green firms obtain a higher share of the net tax balance and of the
warm-glow utility as θ increases, rendering the tax less attractive to green consumers. Under
the extreme case of monopoly limit pricing, the green firm captures all the warm-glow utility
and green consumers end up with the same utility than the neutral ones.
We also obtain that the threshold value of ω above which consumers prefer the standard
increases with X, for both types of consumers. This is because the tax increases both x0
and x1 while the standard leaves x1 unchanged. Therefore, to achieve a higher target X, the
brown quality x0 has to increase more with the standard than with the tax, increasing its
price and making the standard less attractive for neutral consumers. For the green consumers,
increasing X with ω constant reduces their warm glow utility ω[x1−x0] with the standard as
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xS0 increases while x
S
1 = c
′(ω) remains unchanged. By contrast, with the tax, the warm glow
utility ω[xτ1 − xτ0] = ω2/γ is constant. Green consumers are then more likely to prefer the tax
when the environmental target X increases.
Overall, if the green consumers’ willingness to pay for greener goods ω is not too high, all
consumers prefer the tax even though it entails a lower material welfare than the standard.
This relative preference for the tax increases with the degree of competition for the green
good (i.e., lower θ) and with the target X. Also, a necessary condition for consumers to favor
a tax to the standard is that the latter be inefficient, in the sense of entailing the supply of
products with heterogeneous marginal abatement costs.
This section has assumed that the target X is exogenously set. We now turn to the
endogeneization of this target by majority voting over, respectively, the standard and the tax.
4 Political economy
4.1 Collective choice of an environmental standard
We now examine the choice of the standard level x0. We assume that voters aim at maxi-
mizing their own utility (including the warm glow component for green voters) when setting
collectively the environmental policy. Recall from (13) and (14) that the neutral consumers’
utility is given by
USn (x0, x
S
1 ) = v − c(x0) + b(X) if x0 < xS1 , (18)
and by
USn (x0, x0) = v − c(x0) + b(x0) if x0 ≥ xS1 , (19)
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with xS1 = c
′−1(ω) following equation (2), and withX = αxS1+(1−α)x0 resulting endogenously




1 ) = v + (1− θ)ω[xS1 − x0]− θc(x0)− (1− θ)c(xS1 ) + b(X) if x0 < xS1 , (20)
and by
USg (x0, x0) = v − c(x0) + b(x0) if x0 ≥ xS1 . (21)
Comparing neutral and green consumers’ utility function, we obtain that they are iden-
tical when x0 ≥ xS1 (homogeneous good) or when θ = 1 (monopoly green producer), while
USn (x0, x
S





21 In the latter case, green firms differentiate themselves
by offering a pricier product, but capture only a fraction of the additional (warm glow) surplus
from green consumers when θ < 1.
We first look sequentially at the most-preferred standard with, respectively, homogeneous
and heterogeneous goods, before turning to the standard maximizing overall utility.
With homogeneous goods (i.e. x0 ≥ xS1 ), the utility-maximizing standard value is the same
for both types of voters, and corresponds to the environmental quality xFB that maximizes
material welfare. This level equalizes the marginal benefit to the marginal cost of the standard,
b′(xFB) = c′(xFB). (22)
This is the preferred standard when a single good is supplied, which occurs when ω < c′(xFB).
With heterogeneous goods (i.e. x0 < x
S
1 ), the utility of neutral consumers in (18) peaks
21Since green consumers can guarantee themselves at least the utility level attained by neutral ones by
buying good x0 at price p0.
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at a standard value denoted by xSV0n and defined by the following first-order condition (FOC):
c′(xSV0n ) = (1− α)b′
!
αxS1 + (1− α)xSV0n
"
. (23)
Compared to (22), the marginal benefit is deflated by 1−α because, with two environmental
qualities xSV0n and x
S
1 , increasing the standard only affects the contribution of neutral con-
sumers to environmental protection X = αxS1 +(1−α)xSV0n . Note that the chosen standard is
always strictly positive because xSV0n = 0 would imply that b
′(XSV ) = 0, a contradiction with
our assumption that b′(.) > 0.
We now turn to the green voters, where (20) peaks at a standard value denoted by xSV0g







αxS1 + (1− α)xSV0g
"
. (24)
The marginal benefit from raising the standard is the same for green and neutral voters (same
RHS of (23) and (24)) but the marginal costs differ. When raising the standard, green voters
lose at the margin some warm glow (ω in the LHS of (24)) and face a variation in the price for
the green good x1 (the second term on the LHS of (24)). This price variation is proportional
to the degree of market power of the green firms, θ, and is thus nil in the case of perfect
competition. With market power, the price of the green good p1 is affected in two opposite
directions by an increase in x0: (i) p1 increases because it is based in part on the cost of
providing the brown good, c(x0), which increases, but (ii) p1 decreases because a larger value
of x0 decreases the warm glow enjoyed by green consumers, and thus the ability of the green
firms to post a mark-up over their costs. Since x0 < x
S
1 implies that c
′(x0) < c
′(xS1 ) = ω, the
term into brackets in the LHS of (24) is negative, so that the net effect of x0 on p1 is always
negative.
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We can reformulate the LHS of (24) as
θc′(xSV0g ) + (1− θ)ω
and comparing it to the LHS of (23), we obtain the rather counter-intuitive result that green
voters prefer a lower standard x0 than neutral voters, since their marginal cost of a higher
standard is larger than for neutral voters (while the marginal benefit is the same).22 This
result is driven by the loss of warm glow as the standard increases, which is only partially
compensated by the price reduction (except in the case of limit pricing where the two effects
cancel out so that consumers are unanimous in their choice of xS0 ).
Finally, applying the implicit function theorem on (23) and (24) shows that both α and ω
decrease the marginal benefit from the standard (through a higher environmental quality of
the green good for ω, and through a higher proportion of agents consuming this good for α),
while ω also increases the marginal cost of the standard for the green voters, and so decrease
xSV0n and x
SV
0g . Similarly, the degree of competition θ impacts the preferred standard of green
voters. A higher θ decreases the LHS of (24) by increasing the weight of the negative term
into brackets, thus increasing xSV0g . As θ increases, green firms capture a larger fraction of the
warm glow effect, so that the decrease in warm glow due to a larger standard is less costly to
green voters.
We have thus obtained the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When products are differentiated on their environmental quality, both types
of consumers prefer the same standard xSV0n under monopoly limit pricing (θ = 1), while green
consumers prefer a lower standard than neutral consumers (xSV0g < x
SV
0n ) for all other degrees
of competition (θ < 1). The chosen standards xSV0n and x
SV
0g are lower than when goods are
homogeneous, and decrease with both α and ω. Furthermore xSV0g increases with θ.
22More precisely, we have that xSV0g < x
SV




1 –i.e., when ω is large enough that the
goods are differentiated at equilibrium.
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We now study under what circumstances voters prefer either a standard generating a single
good with quality x0 = x
FB or rather a lower standard (xSV0j for type j = {n, g}) inducing
product differentiation along the environmental quality dimension.
Let ω̃j be the unique value of ω equalizing type j = {n, g}’s consumer utility with an
homogeneous good of environmental quality xFB with heterogeneous goods of qualities xSV0j
and xS1 . More precisely, we denote by ω̃n the unique value of ω such that
b(αxS1 + (1− α)xSV0n )− c(xSV0n ) = b(xFB)− c(xFB), (25)
with xS1 , x
SV
0n and x
FB defined by (2), (23) and (22) respectively. Similarly, let ω̃g be the
unique value of ω such that:
b(αxS1 +(1−α)xSV0g )+(1− θ)ω[xS1 −xSV0g ]− θc(xSV0g )− (1− θ)c(xS1 ) = b(xFB)− c(xFB) (26)
with xSV0g defined by (24).
We establish the following proposition, proved in Appendix D.
Proposition 6 Type j = {n, g}’s consumers vote for the standard xFB that maximizes ma-




generates product differentiation if ω > ω̃j. The threshold ω̃j decreases with α, and ω̃g < ω̃n.
The citizens’ choice of standard depends on green consumers’ willingness to pay for envi-
ronmental quality. If ω is low, the green version of the good is not supplied. All citizens vote
for the same standard level maximizing their material welfare. Environmental protection is
at the efficient level equalizing marginal cost and benefit of the standard. All the benefit from
production goes to consumers.
When ω reaches a threshold level, the majority of voters prefer a standard lower than the
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material welfare-maximizing one, and goods of differentiated qualities are produced.23 Neutral
voters free ride on the higher quality of the good consumed by green voters, and green voters
lower the standard to enjoy a lower price and more warm glow, with only a fraction of this
additional utility captured by green firms.24 Lemmas 1 and 2 in the proof of Proposition
6 imply that xS1 < x
FB for this threshold level of ω. The switch towards a new majority
voting equilibrium then occurs discontinuously, with a decrease in the environmental quality
of both goods (compared with xS0 = x
FB) which reduces overall environmental protection
X. In other words, the environmental quality decreases discontinuously at the precise point
where the green good is supplied.
As the level of green consumerism ω increases beyond this threshold, the environmen-
tal quality of the green good improves while the standard becomes laxer. Environmental
protection X improves driven by the demand for environmental quality by green consumers,
although it is still under-provided. In contrast to the case of homogeneous goods, the standard
fails to fix the environmental and market power market failures.
Green consumerism then has a negative impact on the environment except when the warm-
glow parameter ω is high enough that the level of environmental protection with product
differentiation XSV exceed the one with homogeneous environmental quality xFB.25
23This threshold is ω̃n if α < 1/2 and ω̃g otherwise.
24The intuition for the impact of α on the threshold ω̃j is that the utility with differentiated good increases
with α (thanks to a better environmental quality for any given standard) while the utility with a single good
of quality xFB is unaffected, so that voters prefer xSV0j < x
S
1 (rather than x0 = x
FB) for a lower value of ω
when α increases. Green voters switch from the xFB standard to the lower one they most-prefer for a lower
value of ω than neutral voters, because this sub-optimal standard allows them to enjoy more warm glow, with
only a fraction of the latter captured by the green firms.
25Indeed as ω tends toward infinity, xSV0n tends toward 0 (see (23)), so that X tends toward αx
S
1 which
tends toward infinity as seen from (2).
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4.2 Collective choice of the environmental tax
We now characterize the preferred tax rate for both types of consumers, using the super-
script τV . We consider first neutral consumers. Under Assumption 1, since xτ1 − xτ0 = ω/γ,
maximizing the neutral consumers’ utility defined in (16) with respect to τ yields26
c′(xτV0n ) + αω = b
′(αxτV1n + (1− α)xτV0n ). (27)
The left-hand term is the marginal cost of increasing environmental quality through a higher
tax while the right-hand term is the marginal benefit. The cost to consumers is twofold:
higher production costs and more tax revenue captured by the green firms.
As for the green consumers, whose utility is given by (17), it is important to note that
the warm-glow utility ω[xτ1 − xτ0] = ω2/γ does not vary with the tax rate. Moreover, the
green consumers’ net tax transfer in (17) can be expressed as τ [θxτ0 + (1 − θ)xτ1 − X] =
τ(1− α− θ)(xτ1 − xτ0) = τ(1− α− θ)ω/γ under Assumption 1.
Maximizing the green consumers’ utility with respect to τ , we obtain the following FOC:
θc′(xτV0g ) + (1− θ)c′(xτV1g ) = b′(αxτV1g + (1− α)xτV0g ) + (1− α− θ)ω. (28)
The left-hand term is the marginal cost of increasing environmental quality by taxing more
while the right-hand term includes the marginal benefit of a better environment and the net
marginal transfer from the tax system. Both the marginal cost and the net marginal transfer
depend on the degree of competition θ.
It turns out that, under Assumption 1, since c′(X) = γX = τ + αω (see equation (33)
in Appendix C), the two FOCs (27) and (28) are identical and such that c′(XτVj ) = b
′(XτVj )
where XτVj = αx
τV
1j + (1− α)xτV0j for j = n, g. Hence XτVj = xFB for j = n, g by definition of
26We assume for the moment an interior solution. See the discussion after Proposition 7 for the case where
ω is high enough that τ = 0 at the equilibrium.
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xFB in (22). We have then proved the following proposition.
Proposition 7 Assume that Assumption 1 holds. All consumers vote for the same tax rate
implementing the aggregate environmental protection level that maximizes material welfare,
xFB, with heterogeneous qualities xτ0 < x
FB < xτ1.
The unanimity-chosen tax level τV decentralizes the material welfare-maximizing environ-
mental protection level, but with productive inefficiencies since x0 is set “too low” and x1 “too
high”. These inefficiencies increase with the level of green consumerism ω, since xτ1−xτ0 = w/γ.
Note also from (33) in Appendix C that τV = γxFB − αω, and is thus decreasing in both the
level and share of green consumerism, ω and α respectively, as environmental protection relies
more on the green consumers’ behavior. Actually, if ω ≥ γxFB/α, the implemented tax is nil.
Brown firms make no abatement effort (xτV0 = 0) while the quality of the green product is
driven by the demand from green consumers as with the standard xτV1 = x
S
1 = ω/γ. Due to
the high taste for environmental quality ω, environmental protection is higher than the level
that maximizes material welfare: XτV = αω/γ > xFB. Furthermore, the unanimously-chosen
tax rate τV does not depend the degree of competition θ.
We summarize the main results obtained with the tax. Unlike with a standard, green
consumerism is effective even when low, since two goods of different qualities are produced as
soon as ω > 0. The preferred tax rate τV is the same for green and neutral consumers, and
implements the level of environmental protection that maximizes material welfare xFB but
with two different levels of environmental quality xτ0 < x
τ
1, which is inefficient.
5 Conclusion
Is green consumerism good for the environment? Not always. Our model sheds light on
two mechanisms by which green consumerism may end up being bad for the environment.
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First, the warm glow enjoyed by green voters may generate market power for green firms.
Second, the induced environmental quality differentiation at equilibrium makes it difficult for
traditional instruments to correct the pollution externality in an efficient way.
Green consumerism then has two impacts on the choice between market-based (i.e., tax)
and command-and-control (i.e., standard) instruments to decentralize any given pollution
target. First, it makes the standard more efficient than the tax in inducing this level, reversing
the usual dominance of market-based instruments. With the tax incentivizing both green and
brown good producers to reduce pollution while the standard constrains only the brown
good’s environmental attributes, the gap between the environmental quality of the two types
of good is higher with a tax. Second, green consumerism also induces consumers to prefer
the inefficient tax to the standard. The environmental quality of the brown version of the
good being lower with the tax, the brown good is also cheaper which benefits the neutral
consumers. Green consumers enjoy a higher warm-glow utility from consuming the green
good with the tax due to the higher wedge between environmental qualities. They also get
back more than the tax they pay by buying the green good.
Green consumerism also affects the majority-chosen level of pollution. Both types of
consumers vote for laxer standards compared to the homogeneous good case. The neutral
consumers do so because they free-ride on the green consumers. The green consumers vote
for an even less stringent standard to increase their warm-glow utility and to lower the price
of the green good. Overall environmental quality is lower with green consumerism than
without unless the willingness to pay for greener goods is strong enough that the higher
environmental performance of the green goods compensates for the laxer standard. With
quadratic costs, voters unanimously decentralize the efficient aggregate level of pollution, but
with differentiated and thus inefficient quality levels for both goods.
Most human economic activities are polluting. Reducing their harmful impact on health,
biodiversity and the climate is costly and requires imposing technological standards, banning
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the most toxic pesticides, or taxing carbon emissions. Such policies are difficult to implement
because they hurt the regulated industries and their customers. Often the easy way to go
for policy-makers is to rely on voluntary programs such as green labels or CSR certification
to nudge producers and consumers. The hope is that enough of them react to the nudge by
changing their behavior in the right direction so that the environmental problem is mitigated.
We argue that, even if it is the case, this easy political solution is far from optimal. First,
it is not cost-effective. Second, the reduction of pollution may be lower than in the absence
of green consumerism, even if the public policy is chosen by majority voting. Overall, green
consumerism may result in a collectively chosen public policy that induces too little pollution
reduction, attained in an inefficient way. Green consumerism is then far from being a panacea
to solve environmental issues.
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A Proof of Proposition 2




0 when ω > 0. From
(8), we obtain that limx1→xτ+0 π1 = αωx
τ
0 > 0, so that π1 is a fortiori positive when maximized
at x1 = x
τ
1.
B Proof of Proposition 3






1 and X = αx
S
1 + (1− α)xS0 = αxτ1 + (1− α)xτ0, we have:
ε = α(xτ1 − xS1 ) = (1− α)(xS0 − xτ0) > 0. (29)







c(xτ1)− c(xS1 ) > c′(xS1 )(xτ1 − xS1 ), (30)
c(xS0 )− c(xτ0) < c′(xS0 )(xS0 − xτ0), (31)
Multiplying (30) by α and (31) by 1−α, taking the difference among the two terms and using
(29), we obtain:
αc(xτ1) + (1− α)c(xτ0)−
#




c′(xS1 )− c′(xS0 )
$
ε. (32)
The right-hand term of (32) is strictly positive because ε > 0, xS1 > x
S
0 and c(.) is convex.
Hence we obtain the desired conclusion.
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C Proof of Proposition 4
We show first that, for any given environmental conservation target X and degree of com-
petition θ, consumers’ utilities are such that they all prefer the tax to the standard when
ω ≤ c′(X). Under Assumption 1, the difference of utility between tax and standard for neutral




1)−USn (X,X) = α
2ω2
2γ > 0.
Furthermore, since USn (X,X) = U
S






1) ≥ U τn(xτ0, xτ1), where the last in-
equality is due to the fact that green consumers can achieve the neutral consumers’ utility








g (X,X). Hence green
consumers prefer the tax as well.
We then move to the case where ω > c′(X). Under Assumption 1, environmental qualities















Furthermore, with those values for xτ0 and x
τ


































1) = v −
τ
2γ














τ 2 − τ
γ
[τ + αω] + b(X) (37)
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The right-hand side of (39) is positive if ω is higher than the threshold ω̃n(X) defined by:
ω̃n(X) ≡ γX
1− (1− α)2
α(1 + (1− α)2)
, (40)
and is negative if ω is lower than ω̃n(X). Hence, we have shown that, given X,neutral
consumers prefer the tax if ω < ω̃n(X), and the standard otherwise. Note also that the
fraction term in (40) is larger than one for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, so that ω̃n(X) > c′(X) = γX.
Moreover, (1− α)2 < 1 so that ω̃n(X) is increasing with X.




















Note that this utility difference is negative for ω = c′(X) (so that ω = γX = αω+ τ resulting
in ω = τ/(1− α)) and is decreasing in ω if
θ < 1− α(1− α), (42)
in which case we then have that green consumers prefer the tax to the standard for all values
of ω. Note that condition (42) is always satisfied if θ < 3/4 = maxα∈[0,1] 1− α(1− α).
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A necessary condition for green voters to prefer the standard is then that θ > 1−α(1−α).























The right-hand side of (43) is positive if ω is higher than the following threshold:
ω̃g(X, θ) = γX
θ − (1− α)2
θ(2− α)− (1− α)(2− α(1− α)) > 0, (44)
which is obviously increasing in X. We have
∂ω̃g(X, θ)
∂θ
= −X γ2α(1− α)
[θ(2− α)− (1− α)(2− α(1− α))]2
< 0,
and ω̃g(X, 1) = ω̃n(X), so that ω̃g(X, θ) > ω̃n(X) > c
′(X) for θ < 1.
D Proof of Proposition 6
(A) Neutral voters and xSV0n
To show that ω̃n is unique, remark that x
FB does not depend on ω, therefore the right-
hand side of (25) does not vary with ω. On the other hand, the left-hand side increases with
ω since its derivative with respect to ω equals αb′(αxS1 + (1− α)xSV0n )
dxS1
dω
> 0 by making use
of (23). Furthermore, xS1 = 0 when ω = 0, and therefore b(αx
S
1 + (1 − α)xSV0n ) − c(xSV0n ) =
maxx{b((1 − α)x) − c(x)} < maxx{b(x) − c(x)} = b(xFB) − c(xFB) by definition of xSV0
and xFB. For ω high enough that xS1 = x
FB, we have b(αxS1 + (1 − α)xSV0n ) − c(xSV0n ) =
maxx{b(αxFB1 +(1−α)x)− c(x)} ≥ b(xFB)− c(xFB). Therefore b(αxS1 +(1−α)xSV0n )− c(xSV0n )
is lower than b(xFB)− c(xFB) for ω < ω̃ and becomes higher for ω > ω̃.
Note that the penultimate step in the preceding paragraph has proved the following lemma,
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which will prove useful later on in the paper.
Lemma 1 ω̃n < ω
S
1
We know that xFB is constant with ω (see (22)), that xSV0n < x
FB and is decreasing with ω
(see Proposition 5), that xS1 is increasing in ω and may be lower or larger than x
FB (since
xS1 = 0 when ω = 0, while it tends towards infinity as ω grows). Hence, the following three
cases exhaust all the possible ones.




For any standard x0 < x
S
1 , the utility Un(x0), defined in the first line of (18), is increasing
with x0 up to x
S
1 . It also increasing with x0 above x
S
1 – i.e., as defined in the second line of
(18), up to x0 = x
FB. It is then decreasing above xFB. Therefore Un(x0) is single-peaked at
x0 = x
FB. Note that xS1 < x
SV
0n implies ω < ω̃n because then b(αx
S
1 + (1−α)xSV0n )− c(xSV0n ) <
b(xSV0n ) − c(xSV0n ) ≤ b(xFB) − c(xFB) where the last inequality is due to the definition of xFB
which maximizes b(x)− c(x) with respect to x.
Case (b) xSV0n < x
FB < xS1
For any standard x0 < x
S
1 , the utility Un(x0) -defined in the first line of (18)- is increasing up
to xSV0n and then decreasing for x0 > x
SV
0n . When x0 > x
S
1 , U(x0) - defined in the second line of
(18)- is decreasing with x0 because x0 > x
FB by assumption. Hence Un(x0) is single-peaked
at x0 = x
SV
0n . Now x
S
1 > x
FB implies ω > ω̃n because maxx b(αx
S
1 + (1 − α)x) − c(x) >
b(αxFB + (1− α)xFB)− c(xFB) = b(xFB)− c(xFB).




Then U(x0) is double-peaked: a first peak at x0 = x
SV
0n on the range [0, x
S
1 ] - when Un(x0) is
defined by the first line of (18)- and a second peak at x0 = x
FB for x0 above x
S
1 . The two
peaks have respective values v − c(xSV0n ) + b(αxS1 + (1− α)xSV0n ) and v − c(xFB) + b(xFB). As
shown at the beginning of the proof, the first peak is lower than the second peak when ω < ω̃n
and becomes higher when ω > ω̃n.
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Finally, to find the impact of α on ω̃n, we define f(ω, a) = b(αx
S




















so that ω̃n decreases with α.
(B) Green voters and xSV0g .
To show that ω̃g is unique, remark that x
FB does not depend on ω, therefore the right-
hand side of (26) does not vary with ω. On the other hand, the left-hand side increases with
ω since its derivative with respect to ω equals (using the envelope theorem for the choice of
xSV0g )




(1− θ)ω − (1− θ)c′(xS1 ) + αb′(X)
$
(45)
and is positive given that c′(xS1 ) = ω.
Note that we have the same three cases (a), (b) and (c) as above (replacing xSV0n by x
SV
0g ).
Take ω such that xSV0g = x
S
1 < x
FB (i.e., the value of ω such that we move from case (a) to
case (b)). The utility of green voters with xSV0g is then equal to b(x
S
1 )− c(xS1 ) which is strictly
lower than b(xFB) − c(xFB). Note that this result also establishes that case (a) corresponds
to values of ω that are lower than ω̃g.
For ω high enough that xS1 = x




b(αxFB + (1− α)x0) + (1− θ)ω(xFB − x0)−
#
θc(x0) + (1− θ)c(xFB)
$
. (46)
Note that xSV0g is precisely the value of x0 which maximizes (46), and that (46) is equal
to b(xFB) − c(xFB) when x0 = xFB. Hence, xSV0g ∕= xFB implies that (46) is larger than
b(xFB)− c(xFB). Note that this result also establishes that case (b) corresponds to values of
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ω that are higher than ω̃g.
Hence, we have proven (i) the uniqueness of ω̃g and (ii) the following lemma.
Lemma 2 ω̃g < ω
S
1
We know that xFB is constant with ω (see (22)), that xSV0g < x
FB and is decreasing with ω
(see Proposition 5), that xS1 is increasing in ω and may be lower or larger than x
FB (since
xS1 = 0 when ω = 0, while it tends towards infinity as ω grows). Hence, the following three
cases exhaust all the possible ones.
Case (a) xS1 < x
SV
0g
For any standard x0 < x
S




1 ), defined in (20), is increasing with x0 up to
xS1 . It also increasing with x0 above x
S
1 – i.e., as defined in (21), up to x0 = x
FB. It is then
decreasing above xFB. Therefore green voters’ utility is single-peaked at x0 = x
FB. Recall
that we have already established above that xS1 < x
SV
0g implies that ω < ω̃g.
Case (b) xSV0g < x
FB < xS1
For any standard x0 < x
S




1 ), defined in (20), is increasing up to x
SV
0g and
then decreasing for x0 > x
SV




g (x0, x0) - defined in (21)- is decreasing with
x0 because x0 > x
FB by assumption. Hence green voters’ utility is single-peaked at x0 = x
SV
0g .
As we have seen above, xFB < xS1 implies that ω < ω̃g.




Then green voters’ utility function is double-peaked: a first peak at x0 = x
SV
0g on the range
[0, xS1 ] - when utility is defined by (20)- and a second peak at x0 = x
FB for x0 above x
S
1 . As
shown at the beginning of the proof, the first peak is lower than the second peak when ω < ω̃g
and becomes higher when ω > ω̃g.
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Finally, to find the impact of α on ω̃g, we define f(ω, a) = b(X) + (1 − θ)ω[xS1 − x0] −




= 0 with f(ω̃,α) = 0. Using the envelope the-





. Using the envelope theorem, we obtain
∂f(ω,α)
∂α
= b′(XSV )(xS1 − xSV0 ) > 0,
∂f(ω,α)
∂ω
> 0 (see (45)), so that ω̃g decreases with
α.
(C) Comparison of thresholds





1 ) = U
S
j (x
FB, xFB) = v − c(xFB) + b(xFB), j = {n, g}, (47)
with xSV0j given by (23) and (24) and with x
S
1 = c
′−1(ω). The proof above has already
















1 ) and that
the RHS of (47) is independent of ω. Hence, we have that ω̃g < ω̃n.
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